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I rst came across one of the many fundamental results of Chico Doria and Newton da
Costa via two references in Ian Stewarts article on Deciding the Undecidable, in Nature, in
1991 ([93]). His references to two separate papers by da Costa and Doria sent me on a wild
goose chase for several months. Eventually I managed to get the two papers ([18], [19]), written
jointly, of course! Over the ensuing decade and a half, their important insights and pioneering
work in many areas of dynamical systems theory and the foundations of mathematics has
had a deep inuence on my thought. My indebtedness to them is immense. Tom Boylan,
Duncan Foley and Stefano Zambelli have shown the kind of critical support that makes it
possible to choose an exotic research agenda (I have in mind a use of this word in the sense
in which da Costa and Doria make exoticassumptions in foundational work). Alas, I alone
am responsible for the remaining errors and infelicities.
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Abstract
It is natural to claim, as I do in this paper, that the emergence of non-
constructivities in economics is entirely due to the formalization of economics by
means of classicalmathematics. I have made similar claims for the emergence
of uncomputabilities and undecidabilities in economics in earlier writings. Here,
on the other hand, I want to suggest a way of confronting uncomputabilites, and
remedying non-constructivities, in economics, and turning them into a positive
force for modelling, for example, endogenous growth, as suggested by Stefano
Zambelli ([107], [108]). In between, a case is made for economics to take se-
riously the kind of mathematical methodology fostered by Feynman and Dirac,
in particular the way they developed the path integral and the   function,
respectively. A sketch of a research programin mathematical economics, anal-
ogous to the way Gödel thought incompleteness and its perplexities should be
interpreted and resolved, is also outlined in the concluding section.
2
1 A Preamble
"It is always right to be extremely suspicious when proofs in math-
ematics are taken with greater generality than is warranted by the
known application of the proof. This is always a case of the mistake
that sees general concepts and particular cases in mathematics. In
set theory we meet this suspect generality at every step."
Wittgenstein: Philosophical Grammar ([104], p.467; italics added)
Solomon Feferman recently ([25], p.99) referred to [Gödels] stunning in-
completeness results in 1931(italics added). Robert Wolf, ([105], p. 151), in
referring to the First Incompleteness Theorem and its proof was no less e¤usive:
what Gödel did prove was .. a shattering revelation. Just for the record, a
precise and concise version of this theorem is as follows ([105], p.150):
Theorem 1 1. Theorem 2 Let K be an axiomatizable extension of Peano
Arithmetic. Then there is a sentence Q of the language of K such that:
(a) If K is consistent, then K 0 Q, and
(b) If K is !-consistent, then K 0s Q, so Q is independent of K
However, as in all careful expositions of the Incompleteness Theorems, Wolfs
elegant book also pointed out the role played by the assumption of !-consistency
in Gödels proof. But unlike many other expositions - rigorous or (misleadingly)
popular1 - Wolf not only went on to clarify, with exemplary care, how Rosser,
in 1936 ([75])2 , weakened the assumption of ! consistency and replaced it with
ordinary consistency; but he also gave a crystal clear explanation of the di¤er-
ence in interpretation between a Gödel sentenceand a Rosser sentence:
"Whereas Gödels sentence [Q] expresses that There is no proof of
me,Rossers sentence expresses the more intricate notion, For any
proof of me, there is a proof of my negation with a smaller Gödel
number.This was a brilliant innovation on Rossers part."
[105], p.152; italics added.
1An excellent exposition of the legions of misleading and incorrect assertions made by scores
of mathematically illiterate attempts at making these theorems tell and do, more than they
can or were intended to do, can be found in the ne recent book by the late Torkel Franzén.
The review of this book by Gary Mar, done with touching sensitivity, is equally brilliant
([28],[54]). A melancholy example, on the other hand, of a misleading popularexposition of
Gödels Theorems is [31]. It escapes the sharp and perceptive analysis of Franzén, posibly
simply because it was published in the same year!
2Franzen (op.cit, p.3; italics added) also observed:
"The property of ! consistency which Gödel assumed in his proof, is a stronger
property than consistency and has a technical avour, unlike the more readily
understandable notion of consistency. However, the American logician J. Barkley
Rosser showed in 1936 that Gödels theorem could be strengthened so that only
the assumption of plain consistency was needed to conclude that the system is
incomplete."
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This conference is a celebration of Gödel and his deep visions and contribu-
tions to logic and time3 . It so happens that this year marks the Rosser Centen-
nial. I want, therefore, to pay homage also to Rosser4 - at least with a nod in
this brief preamble - for having made the signicance of the shatteringFirst
Incompleteness Theorem, and its revelations, more readily comprehensible and
slightly less technical. This laudable characteristic in Rosser, of being able to
simplify over-general concepts and replace them with more down-to-earth ones,
was also evident in at least two of his wonderfully pedagogical books: Logic and
Simplied Independence Proofs ([77], [78]). In these two elegant books Rosser
took a mathematically able novice, literally by the hand, and gently brought
such a person to the frontiers of research in mathematical logic. The former is in
that class of remarkable collection of pedagogically outstanding books written
by the pioneers of logic and recursion theory, Kleene, Church, Davis and Rogers
([43], [16], [21], [74]) after Gödel and Turing ([99]); the latter was, for many
years, in a class of its own.
But there are additional reasons, in the context of this paper, why I would
like to invoke that classic Rosser 1936 paper. The best way to make my point
would be to quote Rosser on the relevant (methodological) point:
"[A] modication is made in Gödels proofs of his theorems ... . The
modications of the proofs make these theorems hold for a much
more general class of logics. Then, by sacricing some generality, it
is proved that simple consistency implies the existence of undecidable
propositions (a strengthening of Gödels Satz VI ..) and that simple
consistency implies the non-existence of an Entscheidungsverfahren
... . The class of logics for which these two results are proved is more
general in some respects and less general in other respects than the
class of logics for which Gödels proof of Satz VI holds ..... ."
[75]; p. 87; italics added.
Rosser has deftly applied the classic trade-o¤ that great mathematicians
consciously make between weakening/strengthening conclusions and weaken-
ing/strengthening hypotheses, when facing a result - i.e., theorem - that is
complex or over-general in some denable sense (a point made with charac-
teristic force by Wittgenstein in the opening quote of this section). This is a
3No better, easily accessible, discussion of Gödels philosophy of time can be found, in the
published literature on his contributions to an interpretation of time in a world of Einstein,
than in Palle Yourgraus lucid writings (cf, for example, [106]).
4My very rst acquaintance with the name Rosser occurred in my own initial attempt
at learning Mathematical Logic using Willard Van Orman Quines book, Mathematical Logic
([70]). Fortunately the cheap second hand edition I bought for myself, in the early 70s was
the Revised Edition; it was also after I had read about Russells Paradox, its discovery and
the dismay it had caused Frege himself. This latter saga is, of course, well documented and
part of the noble spirit of intellectual integrity. So, when I read in Quines Preface to the
Revised Editionthat the prime mover of the most important revision was Rosserand that
the revisions in [the revised edition had] a¤ected half the pages, my curiosity, without the
requisite maturity, was aroused. But it was not till over a quarter of a century later that I
read Rosser seriously.
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standard method that constructive mathematicians routinely apply in their con-
stant struggle to constructivise classical mathematical theorems ([52], [97]). A
paradigmatic example will be discussed in the next section. Rossers use of this
methodology in a conscious and determined way to one of the great theorems
of mathematical logic is, surely, to be applauded and, more importantly, to be
used as a pedagogical devise in mathematical education.
Secondly, at a much more elementary level, again given the context of this
paper the backdrop of a computable economist I would like to take another
Rosserianpedagogical example. Rosser did not only write advancedtexts
in mathematical logic from an elementary standpoint (pace Felix Klein!). He
also wrote an exemplary elementary text on teaching calculus with a pocket
calculator, obviously in the days before the ubiquity of the personal computer
([79]). I actively sought out this book - partly with a curiosity as to how one
of the pioneers of the    calculus and the joint architect of the fundamental
Church-Rosser theorem would write a book on elementary calculus that might
be consistent with the advanced work on dening functions procedurally. Given
the experiences of reading his more advanced books, I was naturally curious to
know how Rosser would approach the problem of teaching such a well-mined
topic as elementary calculus famously troublesome at the introductory level
from the point of view of motivation. I need not have had the slightest of
misgivings. The very rst chapter begins as follows:
"Calculus is mainly a study of functions. ... For f to be a
function, f must be a rule, a procedure, or mechanism which for a
given x (in the domain of f) prescribes a unique y, called f(x):
Throughout much of calculus ..... the main question about some
function f is: Given a numerical value of x, what is the unique
corresponding numerical value y = f(x)?
Why should this be a problem? For f to be a function, it must
prescribe y, and uniquely so. But there are ways of prescribing y
that do not give much of a clue as to how to calculate a numerical
approximation for its value."
[79], pp. 10-11; italics added.
I suspect the modern student could easily have been introduced to LISP
quite immediately after the rst lecture of such an elementary calculus course5 ,
and, indeed, even to Churchs Thesis. As a computable economist, familiar
with the basics of the  calculus, I discern in this kind of denition, compared
to the intrinsically non-numerical, non-e¤ective ones given in standard texts6 ,
5 If one remembers that Church was trying to dene, with the  calculus; functions as rules
of computation rather than as graphs of argument -value pairs, then, of course, everything
becomes easier.
6For a thoroughly non-e¤ective and muddled denition of function, given in the name of
rigour, see the recent advanced text in mathematical economics by Ok ([64], pp.20-22). Even
reputable texts, for e.g., [69], p. 10, [34], p. 60, and even the classic of its genre, Courant-
John, give denitions divorced from the notion of approximation, numerical evaluation and
the procedures and mechanisms that will have to be devised to determine the unique value
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claiming to be underpinned by rigour(without ever dening it), the umbilical
chord linking computational procedures, approximation7 and estimation right
at the very beginning of the long journey into the higher realms of analysis.
Economics, in particular, is replete with ways of prescribing y that do not give
much of a clue as to how to calculate a numerical approximation for its value.
Most mathematical economists routinely invoke the kind of denition given, for
example in [69], p.10 (italics in the original):
"A function f from <1 into <1 is a relation in which no two ordered
pairs have the same rst element"
How on earth can such a denition train and hone the economists intuitions
in ways that could make the subject meaningfully quantitative? No wonder,
then, that the economist seems always to think that theory is about proving
existence theorems and, at a second stage, procedures have to be devised, often
unconnected with the methods used in the proof of existence - say of an equi-
librium - to compute an approximation to the equilibrium. Rosser, a pioneer of
recursion theory and a pedagogical maestro, links us with the original meaning
of the subject, as it was conceived by Newton and Leibniz, in such a way that
computation, approximation and numerical meaning play their decisive roles
from the outset.
But, of course, Rosser was a pioneer of recursion theory in its    calculus
incarnation, where the Church-Rosser theorem was cardinal. To be able to dene
a function for an elementary calculus audience, in such a way that it links up to
the deepest notions of computable functions, is an achievement that may have
seemed natural and simple for someone who was there, at the beginning, with
Church, and the creation of the   calculus:
For all of these reasons and, in the context of this conference, for making
the Gödel Incompleteness Theorems simpler and more perspicacious  I pay
homage also to Rosser.
2 Mathematical Foundations
"Moreover, I think the Platonistic philosophy of mathematics that
is currently claimed to justify set theory and mathematics more
generally is thoroughly unsatisfactory and that some other philoso-
phy grounded in inter-subjective human conceptions will have to be
of y. On the other hand, for an enlightened modern denition, entirely in line with Rossers
approach, with appropriate warnings when non-constructive reasonings are invoked, Esteps
recent textbook is exemplary ([24]). The link calculus!functions!procedure!numerical
approximation is reected in Esteps innovative denitional statement that analysis means
approximation and estimation(ibid,p.1). I shall have the pleasure of returning to issues raised
by Estep later in this paper.
7Not long after his celebrated work on replacing !-consistency with simple consistency,
Rosser also derived his famous theorem on a rigorous lower bound for the prime number
theorem ([76]). This is the kind of result a genuine analyst, interested in computation and
approximation, would be expected to work on - but few derive.
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sought to explain the apparent objectivity of mathematics. Finally,
I see no evidence for the practical need for new axioms to settle open
arithmetical and nite combinatorial problems."
Solomon Feferman8 ([25], pp. 109-10; italics added)
The task I have set myself in this paper is to outline the nature and the ex-
plicitly acknowledged methodological aim of mathematical economics from the
point of view of what I shall call Algorithmic Economics. I coined the name
Computable Economics, about seventeen years ago, at a time when I was try-
ing, together with my friend Stefano Zambelli, to reformalize the fundamental
concepts of economic theory - what I have referred to as the closure of economic
theory - on the basis of recursion theory9 . I want, now, to study the current,
orthodox, formalization of economic theory and the resulting mathematical eco-
nomics and the foundational justications explicitly given for it  from the
point of view of recursion theory and constructive mathematics. Hence Algo-
rithmic Economics, of which Computable Economics is a proper subset10 . To
some extent the best way to tell this story would be to describe - eschewing, as
much as possible, Whig tendencies - how economic theory was mathematised.
A full development of what is outlined here will form, in the near future, the
core of such a narrative. In the limited time and space allowed, this will have
to be an outline.
Let me begin by circumscribing, for the purpose of this paper, mathematical
economics to mean general equilibrium theory, game theory and the generally
recognised and accepted mathematical core of newclassical macroeconomics: i.e.,
recursive macroeconomics.
I want to begin, by way of an introduction to the main themes of un-
computabilities, undecidabilities, unsolvabilities and nonconstructivities in eco-
nomics, when economic theory is viewed as algorithmic economics, with a dis-
cussion of three famous and classic examples in physics and mathematics. These
8This particular pungent observation by the always stimulating Feferman was preceded by
an equally punchy footnote, (ibid,p.109; rst set of italics added):
"CH [the Continuum Hypothesis ] is just the most prominent example of many
set-theoretical statements that I consider to be inherently vague. Of course, one
may reason condently within set theory (e.g., in ZFC) about such statements as
if they had a denite meaning."
9 In the sense in which it was suggested by Arrow, [2], p.S398 (although I was already in
the happy position of taking these next stepsbefore I was able to invoke Arrows admonition
in support):
"The next step in [economic] analysis .... is a more consistent assumption of
computability in the formulation of economic hypotheses."
10 In the same sense in which Linear Programming is a subsetof Integer Linear Program-
ming ; Classical Mathematics a subsetof Constructive Mathematics ; and, most importantly,
from an economic point of view, the way in which orthodox rationality is a proper subset
of bounded rationality. In the latter case, the usual view is the converse inclusion. I have
explained in other writings why this usual viewis misleading and mistaken.
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examples, the Feynman Path Integral, the Dirac  function and Bishops Con-
structive Mathematics (henceforth: BCM ), give me the fulcrum around which
I shall base my discussion of issues in mathematical economics from the point
of view of algorithmic economics.
I shall assume that readers know the mathematics of the Feynman Path
Integral (method) and the Dirac  function; explanations, denitions and the
formal mathematics of both of them are easily available at any level of textbook
exposition. To assume knowledge of BCM in the same way may not be justied,
but cannot be helped. The best I can do is to refer to Bishops classic ([4]) and
the ne summary in the exposition by Bridges and Richman ([11], where BCM
is referred to as BISH ).
In his recent Cantor Medal Award lecture given at the meeting of the German
Mathematical Society ([53]), Yu Manin observed, with precise eloquence (for
one who had invoked a God who was an unpredictable poet in the opening
sentence11), as follows (p.9; italics added):
"[R]equirements of quantum physics considerably heightened the de-
gree of tolerance of mathematicians to the imprecise but highly stim-
ulating theoretical discourse conducted by physicists. This led, in
particular, to the emergence of Feynmans path integral as one of the
most active areas of research in topology and algebraic geometry,
even though the mathematical status of path integral is in no better
shape than that of Riemann integral before Keplers Stereometry of
Wine Barrels [Stereometria Doliorum Vinariorum]12 . "
11The opening quote of the lecture was from Tasi´c ([95]; italics added):
"God is no geometer, rather an unpredictable poet."
My perplexity here is whether the qualifying adjective is necessary; i.e., poets, by denition,
are unpredictable. Therefore it would have been su¢ cient to characterise God simply as a
poet !
12 I cannot resist the temptation to quote from a recent paper by Segre [88], p.3; italics
added):
"Let us briey recall Feynmans way of arriving [at] his mathematically non
rigorous but physically extraordinary path-integral formulation of Quantum Me-
chanics". ...
The basic steps are [four]:
......
4. A mathematically meaningless limit for n ! +1 (and hence  ! 0) in
which the mathematically meaningless object limn!+1( 12 )
n
2 n 1k=1dqk is re-
placed with the mathematically meaningless functional measure [dq(t)]:
Such a derivation is [most] impressive for the complete lack of mathematical
meaning of [the fourth step] as well as it is impressive for the geniality of the
physical intuition underlying it, a geniality resulting in the physically extraordi-
nary path-integral formulation of Quantum Mechanics, with no doubt one of the
greatest achievements of 20th- centurys Theoretical Physics"
Alas, no such felicitous example of mathematically meaningless derivation of an economi-
cally intuited great result can be found in 20th century mathematical economics. Why not? I
conjecture and shall try to make a case below that it is because the mathematical econo-
mists have pawned their economic intuition (if ever they had one) to the broker dealing in
classical mathematics and its axiomatic handmaiden, ZFC.
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Kepler, as we know, objected to the rule-of-thumb methods of wine mer-
chants to estimate the liquid contents of a barrel of wine. I take it that Fey-
namn, here, is the wine merchant, and the rigorous mathematicians are to play
the role of Kepler. In other words the Feynman path integral is to be inter-
preted as a rule-of-thumbalgorithm13 . A clear understanding of Feynmans
purpose in devising his algorithmicpath integral would clarify the role played
by operational mathematics, physical intuition and a particular discipline pro-
vided by an epistemological question . The role of operational mathematics - by
which I mean the classical mathematical tools, for example the kind one would
learn in an advanced text on methods of mathematical physics, say of the clas-
sic Courant-Hilbert, [20], variety - and physical intuition, honed by quantum
mechanical theory, is readily available in the technical literature and is fairly
well known. But the epistemological aspect which added a particular discipline
to Feynmans quest which led to the invention of the path integral is less well
known. Feynman had been searching the literature - mathematical as well as
mathematical physics - for earlier attempts that may have connected quantum-
mechanical dynamics with Lagrangians or Hamiltonian principles. This is where
the methodological disciplineentered decisively in the invention of the path
integral, as told by Feynman himself ([27], p. viii; italics added):
"During some conversations with a visiting European physicist,
Feynman learned of a paper in which Dirac had suggested that the
exponential function of i times the lagrangian was analogous to a
transformation function for the quantum-mechanical wave function
in that the wave function at one moment could be related to the wave
function at the next moment (a time interval  later) by multiplying
with such an exponential function.
The question that then arose was what Dirac had meant by the
phrase analogous to,and Feynman determined to nd out whether
or not it would be possible to substitute the phrase equal to.A brief
analysis showed that indeed this exponential function could be used
in this manner directly. ...
However, in the application of this function it is necessary to
carry out integrals over all space variables at every instant of time.
...
[T]he idea of integral over all pathswas developed as a way
of both describing and evaluating the required integration over space
coordinates. ....Actually, the path integral did not then provide, nor
has it since provided, a truly satisfactory method of avoiding the
divergence di¢ culties of quantum electrodynamics, but it has been
found to be most useful in solving other problems in that eld."
13A few days ago I asked my friend Chico Doria whether he knew of any recent success
in taming the Feynman path integral axiomatically. His answer, as always illuminating, sug-
gested the addition of the qualication algorithm to rule-of-thumb, although my native
behavioural economic intution would have naturally suggested rule-of-thumb procedure. The
point, however, is that the rule-of-thumb qualication to algorithm, suggests the non-
axiomatizable nature of the Feynman path integral, which is my main point.
9
It was the impetus provided by the epistemological (analogous to) Dirac
hint, backed up by a full command of the operational mathematics of the meth-
ods of mathematical physics, and a search for whether there was an algo-
rithmicway of representing (describing) and computing (evaluating) the re-
quired integrationthat led to the construction of the path integralas we know
it today. Can this algorithmbe encapsulated by an axiom system? Could
it have been derivedby starting from an axiom system? The former question
remains an open one; the latter is, in my opinion, a pointless exercise, precisely
in the sense of the last sentence of Fefermans quote with which this section
opened, except that Feferman could have added physicsto open arithmetical
and nite combinatorial problems. The point really is whether axiomatic is-
sues played any role in the invention of the path integral; whether rigorously
justiable mathematics is (was!) necessary for the way Feynman went about
devising the path integral; whether such a straitjacket would not have hindered
the development of one of the most versatile conceptual and computational tools
of 20th century theoretical physics. Clearly, the answers to all of these questions
are in the negative.
I do not know of any example in mathematical economics where such a sys-
tematic search for a mathematical solution to a foundational economic problem
was attempted, let alone succeeded in devising a new algorithmic device. The
mathematical economist bends and moulds the economic concepts to t the
concepts and methods of classical mathematics, in the rst stage. At a second
stage, (illegitimate) approximations are attempted to compute demonstrably
uncomputable and nonconstructive entities. More on this later, but the issue of
approximation and the role played by Diracs intuition in the development of
the path integral leads me to the issue of the Dirac  function14 .
This powerful concept and mathematical device, eminently successful as a
hilfenkonstruktion in physics - both theoretically and computationally - was, as
is well known, denounced by von Neumann himself for being improper, from
a mathematical point of view; i.e., not a proper function in the rigorous (sic!)
mathematical sense. We know now that it was mathematics that had to broaden
14There is no better summary of my methodological approach to the  function than the
one given by an eminent mathematician, with complete candour, Jacob Schwartz, [[86], p.21]:
"The sorry history of the  function should teach us the pitfalls of rigor. Used
repeatedly by Heaviside in the last century, used constantly and systematically
by physicists since the 1920s, this function remained for mathematicians a mon-
strosity and an amusing example of the physicistsnaiveté until it was realized
that the  function was not literally a function but a generalized function. It
is not hard to surmise that this history will be repeated for many of the no-
tions of mathematical physics which are currently regarded as mathematically
questionable. The physicist rightly dreads precise argument, since an argument
which is only convincing if precise loses all its force if the assumptions upon
which it is based are slightly changed, while an argument which is convincing
though imprecise may well be stable under small perturbations of its underlying
axioms."
The mathematical economists, alas, do not subscribe to this eminently sensible approach,
advocated with such eloquence by a formidable mathematician.
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its conceptual domain so as to encapsulate the  function, rather than the other
way about15 . The points I wish to emphasize here, as in the case of the path
integral, are the roles played by approximation and computation in the saga that
led to Diracs development of the  function and Schwartzs generalization of
the notion of the function concept to encapsulate Diracs intuitive use of it in a
rigorous mathematical formalism. First, therefore, Schwartzs ex post rationale
of the state of a¤airs ex ante (ibid, pp.217-8; italics added):
"[P]ysicists lived [prior to the discovery of distributions, in No-
vember, 1944] in a fantastic universe which they knew how to ma-
nipulate admirably, and almost faultlessly, without ever being able
to justify anything. In this way they made great advances in the-
oretical physics. They deserved the same reproaches as Heaviside:
their computations were insane by standards of mathematical rigour,
but they gave absolutely correct results, so one could think a proper
mathematical justication must exist. Almost no one looked for one,
though. ....
...[I]ts a good thing that theoretical physicists do not wait for
mathematical justication before going ahead with their theories."
There is not a hope in hell that the mathematical economists would al-
low economic theorists to go ahead with their theories unless they are rst
sanctioned by so-called rigorous mathematics, which essentially means classical
mathematics + ZFC, underpinned by a Platonic philosophy. Keynes, supreme
in his intuitions about the workings of a capitalist economy, has e¤ectively been
banished from the citadels of economic theory on the grounds of being an in-
del with respect to mathematical justication of his conceptual framework. It
is easy to show that a Keynesian formalized framework will have to go beyond
classical mathematics for it to be encapsulated mathematically.
But this was an aside. To return to my theme of computation and approxi-
mation, I shall have to go back to Dirac himself, as I did in the case of Feynman.
Diracs underlying methodological and epistemological viewpoints disciplined
the way he understood and developed the frontiers of physics, with great suc-
cess it must be noted. Five principles can be discerned in his actual activity as
a supremely original mathematical physicist: mathematical beauty, symmetry,
meaning, intuition and approximation. Continuing with the Feynman, Schwartz
theme of the irrelevance of mathematical rigour in the development of mathe-
matical physics, it may be useful to recall Henry Margenaus 1933 reection on
Dirac vs. von Neumannon method and philosophy of method:
"While Dirac presents his reasoning with admirable simplicity and
allows himself to be guided at every step by physical intuition - refus-
15The beautiful and poignant autobiography of Laurent Schwartz, the man who discovered
distributions, or generalized functions, to generalize the notion of functions gives a fulsome
discussion of the road from the Heaviside operator calculus, its justication by Wiener and
van der Pol, its modied use by Dirac and the eventual mathematical justication of the Dirac
 function by Schwartzs own discoveries. See, in particular, chapter VI of A Mathematician
Grappling with his Century ([87]).
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ing at several places to be guided by the impediment of mathematical
rigour - von Neumann goes at his problems equipped with the nicest
of modern mathematical tools and analyses it to the satisfaction of
those whose demands for logical completeness are most exacting."
[47], p.279; italics added.
Dirac had to reconcile the need for approximations in the natural sciences,
particularly in fundamental physics, with his disciplining criterion of mathemat-
ical beauty. Formulas, theories and theorems had to be beautiful, a notion
on which he had denitive views and a belief that was a driving force in his
pioneering work in theoretical physics. But whatever criterion of mathematical
beauty one used or invoked, it was not self-evident that any formula, par-
ticularly those derived experimentally, or any particular approximationwould
satisfy any such criterion. He qualied the role of formulae by the view that
any formula has meaning and the beauty could be found in the meaning; and
only physical intuition, a mastery of the subject matter and an understanding
of the kind of operational mathematics mentioned earlier and immense mental
and disciplined experimental e¤ort would give that . As for approximation:
"It seemed to me [around 1918] that if one worked with approxi-
mations there was an intolerable ugliness in ones work, and I very
much wanted to preserve mathematical beauty. Well, the engineering
training which I received did teach me to tolerate approximations,
and I was able to see that even theories based on approximations
could sometimes have a considerable amount of beauty in them ....
I think if I had not had this engineering training, I should not have
had any success with the kind of work that I did later on, because
it was really necessary to get away from the point of view that one
dealt only with results which could be deduced logically from known
exact laws which one accepted, in which one had implicit faith."
[47], p. 280; italics added.
Well, mathematical economists have been doing everything possible not to
get away from the point of view from which Dirac absconded! More impor-
tantly, he sensed the need for approximation in computations and the need
for computations in extracting intuitively natural physical laws from mathe-
matically beautiful theorems, which then may well have to be represented as
formulas, whose own inner beauty had to be understood from their meaning.
Thus, the Dirac program16 , o¢ ciallyeschewing the useless shackles of mathe-
matical rigour and an underpinning in axiomatizable mathematical systems, led
16Laurent Schwartzs discovery of Distributionswas directly inspired by the mathematical
perplexity it had aroused in him during his University days ([87], p.218):
"I believe I heard of the Dirac function for the rst time in my second year at the
ENS. I remember .. that those formulas were so crazy from the mathematical
point of view that there was simply no question of accepting them. It didnt
even seem possible to conceive of a justication. These reections date back
to 1935, and in 1944, nine years later, I discovered distributions.. The original
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to a fruitful development of theoretical physics, but also mathematics (and even
mathematical logic), in the same sense in which it was pointed out by Manin
on the Feynman path integral and by Schwartz on the Dirac  function17 .
I come, nally, to constructive mathematics. Most of what I have to say
refers to Bishops constructive mathematics (BCM. [4]), but much of my dis-
cussion can be rephrased to hold for any variety of constructive mathematics
([11]). I want to discuss the roles of the intermediate value theorem (IVT ),
the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, the Hahn-Banach theorem and the axiom of
choice (in constructive mathematics), as a prelude to dissecting, in a cursory and
preliminary way, the roles they play in Mathematical Economics. In addition,
there is the question of the axiomatization of BCM and the encapsulation of
the notion of algorithm used in BCM in the form of a thesis, analogous to the
Church-Turing thesis in recursion theory. Let me begin with the intermediate
value theorem, simply because it is what a beginning student of mathemati-
cal economics would have encountered in an elementary lecture on analysis for
economists. This example will allow me to link up with the explicit strategy
adopted by Rosser to replace the assumption of ! consistency with simple
consistency in Gödels Theorem (see §1, above).
The intermediate value theorem, in a simple form, is as follows:
Theorem 3 Let f : < ! < be a continuous function, from the closed interval
[a,b] to <; and let:f f(a) < 0
f(b) > 0
: Then 9x 2 < & a < x < b; s.t f(x) = 0:
To the best of my knowledge no elementary or even intermediate analy-
sis textbook or monograph ever warns an unwary reader that this elementary
theoremdoes not hold constructively (nor, of course, why it does not hold con-
structively). Consider the following function f(x); depending on a parameter
 2 <:
f(x) = f
x  2 if x  2 < 
 if x  4    x  2
x  4 if   x  4
; the diagram below almost accurately
depicts the behaviour of this function (where, above the thickline  > 0; and
below it,  < 0):
The zero of f cannot be determined, obviously, without additional knowl-
edge whether   0 or   0. For, the zero of f changes from 4 to 2; for any
reections remained with me, and became part of the accumulated material ..
which remained in a corner of my mind, only to explode suddenly the night I
discovered distributions , in November, 1944."
17The generalization of the function concept, inspired by the needs of theoretical physics
as envisaged by a supremely intuitively rigorous theoretical physicist, that resulted in Dis-
tributions, had the important computationalpurpose of being able to work with functions
that were always di¤erentiable. After the Weierstrassian monstrositieshad been discovered,
rst by Takagi, in 1903, in an explicit example, (cf. [94]), of functions that were continuous
everywhere but di¤erntiable nowhere, there was a hiatus waiting to be lled: a hiatus that
could have been lled either by re-interpreting the notion of function or generalizing it. The
latter path resulted - but not because it was an exercise in gratuitous generalization ([87],
p. 211); but because it was motivated by the needs of a theoretical problem solver.
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arbitrary change in the value of , from negative to a positive value. There-
fore, the zero of f cannot be determined with any preassigned, desired, degree
of accuracy. What would be the constructivists strategy? The constructivists
standard method, when confronted with a classicalnon-constructive theorem is
to either weaken the conclusion or strengthen the hypothesis (see [52], p.274 and
[98], p.23). The attentive reader may now note the similarity of this construc-
tivisingstrategy with that adopted by Rosser when replacing ! consistency
with simpleconsistency in Gödels Theorem. To understand, for example how
to weaken the conclusion, it is necessary to understand the non-constructive
content of the original classicaltheorem: the proof is by contradiction, assum-
ing, rst, that no point of f lies on the axis and deriving a contradiction. The
proof, by itself, says nothing about how to nd the point on the curve for which
f(x) = 0. This is standard practice in existence proofs in classicalmathematics
and, a fortiori, in mathematical economics.
Now armed with this knowledge, the constructivist can proceed to weaken
the conclusion, which is done by observing that it is possible to determine
constructively, 8" > 0; a x 2 < & a < x < b s.t jf(x)j < " . A precisely formal
constructivist IVT :
Theorem 4 Let f : < ! < be a continuous function, from [a; b] 2 < to <; and
let:f f(a) < 0
f(b) > 0
; then, 8" > 0;9x 2 <; a < x < b;s.t jf(x)j < ":
The constructivsts strengthening of the hypothesis results in a second con-
structive IVT which is precisely what is needed to prove, constructively, that
the reals are algebraically closed. One way to strengthen the hypothesis is to
assume that f(x) is a polynomial. It can be seen, then, that in the rst case
the constructivist obtains an approximation to the value of x which determines
a zero of the function; in the second case, the constructivist rst approximates
the given function (in this case by a polynomial) and then obtains an exact
value of x which determines f(x) = 0: Either way, an approximation is precisely
determined. The ubiquity of approximation in computation in the context of
analysis is the reason for Estep to ask a pertinent question, on the very rst
page of his excellent intermediate level analysis text, and answer it as follows:
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"What is analysis? .. To applied mathematicians, analysis
means approximation and estimation. .... .
To puremathematicians, ..., analysis is the study of the limiting
behaviour of innite processes. ...
But these two viewpoints of analysis describe the same activ-
ity. Approximation and estimation imply some notion of limit, that
is the possibility of obtaining full accuracy as the limit of the ap-
proximation process. On the other hand, the concept of a limit also
implies an approximation that can be made as accurate as desired."
[24], pp. 1-2; italics added.
Of course, the pure mathematicianin the above denition is a constructive
analyst, for, if not, the last sentence cannot make sense. This is what is high-
lighted by the proof of the elementary IVT, which is devoid of any and all
numerical content.
I shall, for reasons of space and time, be relatively brief about the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem, the Hahn-Banach theorem and the axiom of choice.
As for the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, the elementary calculus lesson will
not always tell you that something like it underpins even the IVT. To get a
avour of this connection I refer the reader to Esteps (op.cit) denition of a
Bisection Algorithm, its role in what he calls Bolzanos theoremand the IVT
as a consequence of the two ([24], chapters, 10 &13, esp. pp. 129-33 & 168-
70). The main point is that the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is proved using a
countable innity of undecidable disjunctions and is not constructiable.
The lesson from the way the IVT was modied to yield two constructive
IVT s is important in the constructivists enterprise, as I indicated above. Thus,
an exercise similar to the way the constructivist weakened the conclusion and
strengthened the hypothesis to yield an approximately exact solution can, of
course, be done for the Hahn-Banach theorem (cf. for example, [4], pp. 262-3;
but also [12], §5.3). One loses the exact preservation of numerically meaningless
classical norms in the constructive version; but gains, as in the case of the
ITV, numerical meaning and exact computational content in the constructive
version.
The Hahn-Banach theorem, in other words, has a constructive version, but
only on subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, classicalversion,
valid on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorns Lemma which is, of
course, equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive18 .
Schechters perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem
is precisely the point I was making with my extensive discussion of the construc-
tivising of the IVT (ibid, p. 135; italics in original; emphasis added).:
18This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see [62].
For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem, both from classical
and a constructive points of view, Schechters encyclopaedic treatise is unbeatable ([84]).
15
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting ones attention to separable spaces19 , for in applied
math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually nds the linear functional
in question."
At an elementary level, the same applies to the constructive versions of the
IVT
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the classical
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of rst formalising in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
These three theorems and the axiom of choice20 are the pillars of the citadel
that is mathematical economics. They are all of them, without exception, com-
pletely devoid of numerical meaning (in the sense of Bishop - see Preface and
Chapter 1 of [4] and [5]) and (hence) algorithmic content. The citadel is replete
with deceptive claims for computable general equilibrium theory, recursive com-
petitive equilibria, computationally e¢ cient decentralized equilibria, and so on.
These claims and assertions are to be taken with a barrel of salt. None of them
are true because they rely, one way or the other, on one or more of the above
three theorems and the axiom of choice.
In other words, the citadel is built on the sands of classicalmathematics and
founded on ZFC. This is the reason for the ubiquity of uncomputabilities, unde-
cidabilities, unsolvabilities and unconstructivities in mathematical economics.
Mathematical economics, as it is today - in content and form - cannot be algo-
rithmic economics. Hence, there is no sense in which there could have arisen
analogues of a Feynman path integral or a Dirac  function, or the kind of re-
search strategies implemented by these two imaginative giants of 20th Century
theoretical physics. Every celebrated theorem in mathematical economics, from
Arrows Impossibility Theorem, via the Nash and Arrow-Debreu equilibria, the
two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, to macroeconomic recursive
19However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, [36], has shown the constructive validity
of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
20 Incidentally, that famous baneof the axiom of choice, the Banach-Tarski Paradoxhas
recently been shown to be implied by the Hahn-Banach Theorem (see [65]). Not with a bit of
my tongue in my cheek, I have been wondering whether I should not try to provethat the
Banach-Tarski Paradox is implied by the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
The traditional folk assumption that there is no such thing as a free lunch can then be
ignored forever.
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competitive equilibria, is plagued by the infelicities common to one or more of
the above theorems. Hence every one of them is rich in uncomputable, non-
constructive, undecidable and unsolvable content. A sketch of how to unearth
them, based upon the discussion above, is outlined below.
Not very recently, Donald Knuth wondered about the di¤erence between
Algorithmic Thinking and Mathematical Thinking([45]). An experimenthe
carried out, in trying to clarify the di¤erence(between the two kinds of think-
ing, if there was one), gave an illuminating result for Bishops Foundations of
Constructive Analysis ([4]):
"The last book I chose to sample turned out to be the most inter-
esting of all from the standpoint of my quest: it was Errett Bishops
Foundations of Constructive Mathematics21 , a book that I had heard
about but never before read. The interesting thing about this book is
that it reads essentially like ordinary mathematics, yet it is entirely
algorithmic in nature, if you look between the lines."
[45], p.177; last set of italics italics added.
The problem with modern mathematical economic scholarship is that no one
reads between the linesany more, especially in books like Bishops.
3 Mathematical Economics
"What relevance, if any, might constructive mathematics have for
economic theory? There are several answers to such a question. For
example, there is the generic response that the use of constructive
methods reveals distinctions between computability and non-computability
that are obscured, often totally, by classical existentialmethods."
Douglas Bridges ([10], p.7; italics added).
My own research, since about 30 years ago has been on trying to understand
the relevance of recursion theory and its applied branches22 for economic theory.
In particular, the investigations of the computable, solvable and decidable impli-
cations of a more systematic assumption of computability in core areas of general
equilibrium theory, game theory and macroeconomics. In much of this work I
was working, consciously, within the discipline of the Church-Turing Thesis and
what I came to call the KolmogorovChaitinSolomono¤Martin-Löf Thesis in
applied recursion theory. More recently I have felt the need to broaden the notion
of algorithm I had been using in my investigation to include constructive mathe-
matics - in particular, Bishop-style constructive analysis. That the Bishop-style
21A rare slip on Knuths part! The word should have been analysis, not mathematics,
in the title of Bishops book.
22By the applied branches of recursion theory I mean: computational, algorithmic and
stochastic complexity theories, in the sense that these elds are based on the foundations of
(classical) recursion theory.
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constructivists refuse to circumscribe their notion of algorithm formally as, for
example, recursion theorists do, by accepting the Church-Turing Thesis, is more
in line with my current Dirac/Feynman-inspired vision (see above) of the role
of mathematics in the applied sciences. Moreover, in recent years, in lectures
and in a few of my writings I expressed disquiet at the prevailing practice, in
mathematical economics circles, of what seemed to be a tacit acceptance of the
belief that the computable functions were a subset of a larger class of more gen-
erally dened and routinely accepted set of functions23 . Finally, the fact that
non-constructive existence proofs are routinely developed in recursion theoretic
frameworks has also troubled my epistemological antennae. Fred Richmans re-
cent perceptive remark encapsulates much of my above disquiet, particularly in
the context of mathematical economics24 :
"My nal example of a nonconstructive existence proof comes from
the theory of computable functions. That theory was developed to
clarify the idea of what it means for a function to be computable.
This is not an idea that would occur to a constructivist, for whom
computability is part of the intuitive idea of a function: if there exists
y such that f(x) = y, then we must be able to construct that y if
we are given x. A constructivist can certainly entertain the idea
of looking at a restricted class of functions that are computed in a
special way, but would be unlikely to call that class the computable
functions. "
[72], pp. 306-7; italics added.
23Over the years I have had fruitful discussions with my friend Francesco Luna on these
matters. I stated, earlier in the paper, that I consider Classical Mathematics a particular
subset of Constructive Mathematics ; also, in an economic theoretic context, that bounded
rationality is the more general notion and not the orthodox denition of rationality. The
analogy, again as mentioned earlier in this paper (and in many of my various writings on
computable economics), is with the sense in which linear programming is a special case of
integer linear programming. The former, by the way, is dened and studied over <; the latter,
usually, over Z (sometimes also over Q).
24The review by Ray Mines of [6] expresses these disquieting sentiments quite clearly ([56],
pp. 162-3; italics added):
"Many people have expressed the view that there should be close ties between
the theory of algorithms [i.e., computability theory] and constructive mathe-
matics. Perhaps because algorithms are innately constructive. ... Times have
changed. Mike Fellow[s] has used Wagoners [sic!] conjecture to show that there
are polynomial time algorithms for solving certain problems in graph theory.
His methods are highly nonconstructive. In fact the existence of these algo-
rithms is probably independent of ZF. So, there are now pure existence proofs
for computer programs that solve real problems, and no hope of ever program-
ming them."
I think Mines is referring to Wagners conjecture (not Wagoner), [102], and to the result
in [26], Theorem B, p. 728:
Any set of nite graphs contains only a nite number of minor-minimal elements.
A graph H is called a minor of a graph G, if a graph isomorphic to H can be obtained from
a subgraph of G be contracting edges.
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No wonder, then, that mathematical logicians who have been trying to nd
a formal system to encapsulate BCM have had the same kind of di¢ culties as
those who have attempted similar encapsulations of the Feynman path integral!
Against the backdrop of this brief preamble, I can now state that the mathe-
matical crown jewels25 in the citadel that is mathematical economics - general
equilibrium theory and game theory - are the contraction mapping theorem, x
point theorems (I shall only consider the Banach Contraction Mapping theorem
and the Brouwer and Schauder x point theorems) and the Hahn-Banach (and
associated separating hyperplane) theorems and, for mathematical macroeco-
nomics, the (mathematically unfortunate and inappropriately named trio of )
recursive tools26 : dynamic programming (DP), Kalman Filtering (KF ) and
Markov Decision Processes (MDP). In the former, equilibrium existence and
their computations and the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics are
the jewels; in the latter, the structure and computation of a recursive computa-
tional equilibrium (see, [17], Chapter 1 and [49], Chapter 12) is fast becoming
the jewel. The existence proofs utilise the contraction mapping theorem, one
or another x point theorem, but overwhelmingly often it is the Brouwer Fix
Point Theorem. Computation of the nonconstructively proved equilibrium is by
means of various alleged algorithms, mathematically underpinned by Uzawas
equivalence theorem ([92], Chapter, 11; [100]) The formalization and proof
of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics depend entirely on the
Hahn-Banach theorem. The computation of a recursive computational equilib-
rium by the rational agent modelled as a signal processor is achieved by using
the macroeconomic crown jewels: DP, KF and MDP.
It will be obvious for anyone familiar with the literature cited in the pre-
vious section, and the discussion of them in it, that these crown jewels carry
with them intrinsic uncomputabilities, undecidabilities, unsolvabilities and non-
constructivities. The task of the following subsections is to be slightly more
explicit about these blemishes in the crown jewels. I expect the discerning
reader to notice that I am emphasizing blemishes in the jewels; not on where
the crown sits, i.e., economic theory27 .
25 In analogy with the metaphor suggested in [62], p. 193 (italics added):
"In its elegance and power, the Hahn-Banach theorem is a favorite of almost
every analyst. Some of its sobriquets include The Analysts Form of the Axiom of
Choice and The Crown Jewel of Functional Analysis. Its principal formulations
are as a dominated extension theorem and as a separation theorem."
It is as a separation theoremthat it plays the crown jewelrole in economic theory.
26Hence Newclassical Macroeconomics is now referred to as Recursive Macroeconomics ([?]).
27On the other hand, having been brought up immersed in the Bhaghawat Ghita, I am
also aware that the headgear is considered part of the head of the wearer. In one of the most
poignant events in the great battles between the Pandavas and the Kaurawas, the divine arrow
red by Karnan, a half-brother to his opponent Arjunan at whom the divine arrow was aimed,
fullled its mission by piercing the crown worn by the latter. Thus, the arrows divine mission
was fullled; and Krishna, as Charioteer, succeeded in saving Arjunan by interpreting the
headgear as part of the head on which the crown that was pierced sat. In nding blemishes in
the jewels in the crown I may, as a cultural Hindu, be trying to pierce the head, too. I dont
know. I will never know.
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My conviction, after all these years of struggling with an understanding of
the non-algorithmic content of mathematical economics, is that the teleologi-
cal element in mathematical economics is entirely attributable to the kind of
mathematics that is used in its formalization. Years ago, reading the following
profound observation by Bishop led me along a path towards an understanding of
these teleological underpinnings and their sources in classical, non-algorithmic,
non-intuitive, mathematics:
"The classical concept of a set as a collection of objects from some
pre-existent universe is clearly inappropriate constructively. Con-
structive mathematics does not postulate a pre-existent universe,
with objects lying around waiting to be collected and grouped into
sets, like shells on a beach. The entities of constructive mathemat-
ics are called into being by the constructing intelligence. From this
point of view, the very question What is a set? is suspect. Rather
we should ask the question, What must one do to construct a set?.
When the question is posed this way, the answer is not hard to nd."
Errett Bishop: Schizophrenia in Contemporary Mathematics ([5],
p.11; italics added).
Lurking behind almost all of these non-algorithmic proofs lies the spectre
of the Axiom of Choice. Even in the simplest dynamic problem of the proof of
existence of a solution to the classic Initial Value Problem of Ordinary Di¤er-
ential Equations (IVPs of ODE s), this axiom rears its head as a spectre right
on the ground oor, in every sense of the word. Long before Zermelo gave con-
tent to the axiom in the form we all know and use it today, in fact precisely
fourteen years before28 , Peano had perceptively realized its potential ubiquity
and immediately rejected it in one of his earliest papers on the IVP problem for
ODEs. He knew what its non-constructive philosophical implications were and
where it reared its head in the IVP problem for ODEs (cf., [57], §.1.8). His rst
objection, and probably the rst formal recognition of the role played by the
(implicit) assumption of the axiom of choice in such questions, to any appeal to
this axiom, came in his pioneering paper on the role of the Lipschitz condition
28Peano referred to the objection he had earlier made to any appeal to what subsequently
came to be called the axiom of choice in his 1906 paper on the Cantor-Bernsteim Theorem
([67], pp. 207-8; italics in original) as follows:
"Zermelo, in proving a proposition about well-ordered classes, adopted and
stated the principle that even for an innite totality of sets there are always
mappings that associate with every set one of its elements .... . This logical
principle cannot, to be sure, be reduced to a still simpler one, but it is applied
without hesitation everywhere in mathematical deduction.
This principle means that we may arbitrarily choose an innite number of
elements. This assumption, which occurs in several books, was already consid-
ered by me in the year 1890, in Math. Ann., 37, p. 210: one may not apply
an innite number of times an arbitrary law according to which to a class a is
made to correspond an individual of that class ....
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in guaranteeing uniqueness of solutions for the IVP problem for ODE (cf. [35],
p. 66, footnote). Peano noted, with great perspicacity:
"[S]ince one cannot apply innitely many times an arbitrary rule by
which one assigns to a class A an individual of this class, a deter-
minate rule is stated here, by which, under suitable hypotheses, one
assigns to each class A a member of this class."
[66], p.210, quoted in: [57], p76; italics in the original29 .
However, Peanos younger Italian colleagues were less scrupulous about ap-
pealing to, or implicitly using, the axiom of choice. Thus Giulio Ascoli had
already in 188430 , ([3]) introduced the concept of equicontinuity, which now un-
derpins the Ascoli-Arzela theorem, a theorem routinely used as a criterion for
compactness31 , quite commonly in mathematical economics. Economists who
appeal to this theorem, or even simply to equicontinuity, do not normally bother
to investigate its non-constructive foundations - as little as they investigate the
simpler Heine-Borel theorem for computability. Ill have something to say about
these things in the context of specic economic examples in the next sub-section.
3.1 Understanding Non-constructivity in Economics
"Assuming that [a family = of functions] is uniformly bounded and
equicontinuous, it is su¢ cient [to show the existence of solutions
to an integral equation] to show that it [=] contains a uniformly
convergent subsequence. The proof ..... appears to be constructive.
However, each step requires deciding whether a given region contains
the graphs of an innite number of functions, something that cannot
be checked by a computer.
[24], p. 589; italics added.
I shall begin with a discussion of x point type models and their non-
constructive (and, occasionally, also non-computable) underpinnings in the rst
29The original by Peano, in French, is ([66], p. 210; italics in original):
"Mais comme on ne peut pas appliquer une innité de fois une loi arbitraire
avec laquelle à une classe a on fait corespondre un individu de cette class, on a
formé, ici une loi déterminée avec laquelle à chaque classe a, sous des hypothèses
convenables, on fai correspondre, un individu de cette classe."
30 In the pseudo-rigorous [64] (footnote, 36, p. 263, a pretentious notein itself), the author
is even sloppy in getting such a simple thing as this date right.
31 I have never seen, in any mathematical economics text, at any level of sophistication,
an appreciation of the non-computable and non-constructive contents of the Heine-Borel the-
orem, the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, the assumption of compactness, completeness and
equicontinuity and many other routinely used mathematical concepts. These theorems and
concepts are routinely used and appealed to by every kind of mathematical economist, with-
out exception. Personally I nd this an unmitigated disaster for anyone seriously interested
in making economics a meaningfully numerical and quantitative subject.
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subsection. I shall then go on, in the second sub-section, to discuss the non-
constructive content and axiom of choice implications of the Hahn-Banach the-
orem.
3.1.1 Contractions and Fix Points
"[T]he famous contraction mapping theorem [is the one] by which
Banach transformed a folk-techniqueinto a theorem."
Körner, [46], p. 287.
But in this wonderful and entertainingly clear advanced Companion to
Analysis, with a characteristically paradoxical title32 , Körner does not warn
the unwary reader that folk-techniques, converted to theorems relying on non-
constructive assumptions, lose their folkiness!
There is a whole chapter titled Fixed-Point Arguments in ([50], Chapter 17),
in what has become the standard textbook for the mathematics of macroeco-
nomics. Three x point results are presented and applied in macroeconomic
contexts: the contraction mapping theorem, the Brouwer x point theorem and
the Schauder x point theorem. They are presented without the slightest com-
ment on their algorithmic content, as if just the formalization of some canonical
economic model - such as an overlapping generation model (OLG) - with the
requisite properties that makes it possible to apply one or the other of these
theorems makes them numerically and computationally33 meaningful.
In all three of the applications the problem, derived from a standard OLG
model, the task is to prove the existence of solutions, f(x); ([50], chapter 17,
p. 507), where: x 2 [a; b] = X  <++ :
f(x) =
Z


x0 1 (f(x0))

(x; dx0); 8x 2 X (1)
where:
 : [0; L)! <+
 : <+ ! <+
 : X ! [0; 1] ; where  : the Borel subsets of X:
To study the existence of solutions f(x) to (1), the following operator T on
functions f : X ! <++ is dened (ibid, p.507) as:
(Tf) (x) =
Z
[x0 1f(x0)](x; dx0) (2)
Obviously, f(x) satises (1) iff it is a xed point of T: For the rest, it is
simply a case of making sure the OLG model satises the appropriate hypotheses
32The subtitle of A Companion to Analysis is: A Second First and First Second Course
in Analysis!
33Although there are no lack of claims on computational feasibilities, always using the
word inappropriately (for example, [50], p.529: This corollary provides a useful computational
check .....). Nothing of the sort - at least if by computationalone means the rigorous concept
underpinned by either constructive or computable analysis.
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to make it possible to apply the Contraction Mapping Theorem, the Brouwer
Fix Point Theorem or the Schauder Fix Point Theorem. Not a single comment
or reservation is made about the hypotheses so as to make any connection with
numerical meaning or computational content.
The key mathematical hypothesis in the (Banach) contraction mapping the-
orem is on the structure of the domain: that it is a complete metric space. This
assumption is made as if it is numerically and computationally innocuous. But
it is not. Let me proceed systematically. First, what is completeness?34
Denition 5 An ordered eld is said to be complete if it obeys the monotone
sequence property.
What, then, is the monotone sequence property?
Denition 6 Let F be an ordered eld. Then F is said to have the monotone
sequence property if every monotone increasing sequence bounded above con-
verges35 .
Now, consider the following result, due to Specker ([90]), from Computable
Analysis ([103]:
Theorem 7 9 an increasing and bounded sequence of computable sequence of
rational numbers whose limit is a non-computable real number.
What kind of numbers can Lucas, Stokey, Prescott or any other economist
feed into a digital computer for computational purposes if not a computable
sequence of rational numbers?
More signicantly, from a constructive mathematical point of view the appeal
to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in proving the completeness property is the
real source of di¢ culty (see the proof of the Cauchy Completeness Theorem
from the Bolzano-Weierstrass property in [55], p.50 and pp.86-7).
Both of these numerical and computational infelicities are easilyremedied
in the spirit of the positive title of this paper: computing the incomputable,
constructing the nonconstructive.... The computable infelicity is directly and
34 I follow the denitions in [55].
35 In Körners exquisitely clear Companion to Analysis, the proof of the demonstration of
the completeness of a metric space invokes this property in the form ([46], p. 254; italics
added):
Suppose a;b 2 l1 [where: l1 :set of real sequences a, with
1X
j=1
jaj j convergent]. We have
NX
j=1
jaj + bj j 
NX
j=1
jaj j+
NX
j=1
jbj j 
1X
j=1
jaj j+
1X
j=1
jbj j ; so, since an increasing sequence bounded
above tends to a limit, it follows that
1X
j=1
jaj + bj j converges and a+ b 2 l1:

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specically remedied to give an E¤ective Contraction Theorem in [39]; the con-
structivisation of a metric space is achieved with characteristic nesse in [4], pp.
83-86.
In earlier writings I have shown the exact non-constructive content of the
standard general equilibrium model; and, a fortiori, in the computable general
equilibrium model. I shall, for convenience, paraphrase and repeat some of these
arguments here, because the non-constructive infelicities discovered here apply,
pari passu, to the application of the Brouwer x point theorem in [50].
Most mathematical economics textbook36 proofs of the Brouwer x point
theorem proceed via some variant of Sperners Lemma as their underpinning;
this lemma, however roundabout, invokes the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem37 .
This theorem, as I have mentioned several times above, invokes an undecidable
disjunction which is cancelled by an implicit appeal to the axiom of choice. The
wording used to camouage the actual undecidability and submerge reliance
on the (full) axiom of choice gives a deceptive appearance of an implementable
process for the proof of the Lemma and, hence, the theorem. For example,
Starrs clear and detailed presentation of the proof of Brouwers x point theo-
rem is based on the excellent and almost elementary exposition in [96] (particu-
larly, pp.424-7). There, in turn, the appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
is made almost as with a magicians wand38 :
"Making [the] assumption [that given any simplex S, there are
subdivisions that are arbitrarily ne] we can now nish the proof
of Brouwers xed-point theorem. We take an innite sequence
of subdivisions of S with mesh, that is, length of the longest one-
dimensional edge, approaching 0. From each subdivision, we choose
one simplex that carries all labels, and in this simplex we choose a
single point. We thus have an innite sequence of points in the orig-
36The very recent textbook by Efe Ok on Real Analysis with Economic Applications ([64],
Chapter D, §8, pp. 272-80) proves the Brouwer x point theorem via the Borsuk Lemma.
The proofs of both the Lemma and the theorem are replete with explicit and implicit non-
constructivities, both logical and analytic. See also, below, my comments on retractions.
37Just for ease of reading the discussion in this section I state, here, the simplest possible
statement of this theorem:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: Every bounded sequence contains a con-
vergent subsequence
38 In the clear and elementary proof of the Brouwer x point theorem given in Starrs
textbook (op.cit), the appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is made when proving the
KKM theorem (p. 62). In Scarfs own elegant text ([82]) invoking of this theorem occurs,
during the proof of Brouwers theorem, on p. 51:
"As the vectors are increasingly rened, a convergent subsequence of sub-
simplices may be found, which tend in the limit to a single vector x." (italics
added)
Scarf is careful to claim that the required subsequence may be found, but does not claim
that it can be found algorithmically. One may wonder: if not found algorithmically, then
how?
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inal simplex S, and we can choose a subsequence that converges to
a single point. This point .. is the limit point of the sequence of all
vertices of all the simplexes from which the points of the convergent
subsequence were originally chosen." ([96], p.427; all italics, except
the rst one, are added)
The deceptive use of the word choosein the above description of a processes
conveys the impression that the choices, in each case, are algorithmically im-
plementable. However, it is only the rst use of the word choose and the
implied choice - i.e., choosing simplexes from increasingly ne subdivisions -
that can be algorithmized constructively. The part that invokes the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem, i.e., Choosing a subsequence that converges to a single
point - incidentally, this point is the sought after xed-point of the Brouwer
theorem - entails undecidable disjunctions and as long as any proof relies on
this aspect of the theorem, it will remain unconstructiable39 . Obviously, this
is where the (full) axiom of choice is invoked, but never acknowledged.
An alternative textbook approach to demonstrating the Brouwer x point
theorem is by way of the non-retraction theorem (cf. [83], §4)40 . To the best
of my knowledge, every demonstration of the Brouwer x point theorem via
a non-retraction theorem proceeds by way of proof by contradiction and an
appeal to the law of double negation in innitary instances41 . Moreover, unless
the retractions are on highly structured spaces, there is no hope whatsoever of
devising algorithms to locate the x points that are non-constructively shown
to exist. Since Brouwers original proof was along these lines, just before he
saw the light, so to speak, and began repudiating his theorem for its non-
intuitionistic and non-constructive nature, it may be useful to make it known
to this audience.
Brouwers proof of his celebrated x point theorem was indirect in two ways:
he proved, rst, the following:
Theorem 8 Given a continuous map of the disk onto itself with no xed points,
39Over fty years ago, when Brouwer returned to the topic of his famous theorem with an
Intuitionist version of it, he made the trenchant observation that seems to have escaped the
attention of mathematical economists:
"[T]he validity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [in intuitionism] would
make the classical and the intuitionist form of xed-point theorems equivalent."
([13], p.1).
The invalidity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in any form of constructivism is due to
its reliance on the law of the excluded middle in an innitary context of choices (cf. also [23],
pp. 10-12) (and the implicit invoking of the full force of the axiom of choice).
40Scarfs discussion of the version of this theorem is based on results in [33]. However,
Hirschs proof of the Brouwer x point theorem in [33] is incorrect (cf. [38]) and, therefore, I
shall not discuss the non-constructive aspects in the connection between Scarfs combinatorial
lemma on labelling a restricted simplex (op.cit, Lemma 3.43) and the non-retraction theorem.
41This is also true of the otherwise lucid paper by Kannai on An Elementary Proof of
the No-Retraction Theorem ([40]). Kannai makes the important observation (ibid, p. 264)
that the no-retraction theorem is, itself, the higher-dimensional analogue of the IVT. That
alone should alert the reader of these pages to the nature of the modications necessary to
constructivise it!
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9 a continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary.
Having proved this, he then took its contrapositive:
Theorem 9 If there is no continuous retraction of the disk to its boundary then
there is no continuous map of the disk to itself without a xed point.
Using the logical principle of equivalence between a proposition and its con-
trapositive and the law of double negation (@ a continuous map with no xed
point = 9 a continuous map with a xed point) Brouwer demonstrated the ex-
istence of a xed point for a continuous map of the disk to itself. This latter
principle is what makes the proof of the Brouwer x point theorem via re-
tractions (or the non-retraction theorem) essentially unconstructiable. Scarfs
attempt to discuss the relationship between these two theorems [i.e., between
the non-retraction and Brouwer x point theorems] and to interpret [his] com-
binatorial lemma [on e¤ectively labelling a restricted simplex] as an example
of the non-retraction theorem is incongruous. This is because Scarf, too, like
the Brouwer at the time of the original proof of his x-point theorem, uses the
full paraphernalia of non-constructive logical principles to link the Brouwer and
non-retraction theorems and his combinatorial lemma42 .
Finally, returning to the determination of f(x) as the x point of the opera-
tor T , in equations (1) and (2) above, but now in the case of mappings between
innite dimensional spaces, Lucas and Stokey extend the Brouwer x point
theorem to the Schauder x point theorem by adding to the hypotheses of the
former the assumption of equicontinuity43 . This is the additional villainof the
piece - compounding the nonconstructivities of undecidable disjunctions due to
the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and doubly depending on the axiom of choice
for it to be useful in proving existence of x points and routinely in proving the
existence of solutions to the IVP problem for ODEs.
The unwary graduate student of economics, with mathematical aptitudes, is
introduced to x points and their application to canonical problems in general
equilibrium theory and macroeconomics, via [50], [64], or any number of other
equally rigorousbooks. They in turn, in their innocence, are taught the obvious
 and, indeed, the immediate  usefulness of these theorems; they are also
taught, expertly, that one moves in a sequence of increased generalizations,
whereby one moves from functions that are contractionsto those that are not
necessarily contractions, and then from spaces that are nite to those that
are transnite. All this seems almost exhilaratingly exciting; but the price
one pays for all these apparent generalizations  from the alleged Walrasian
42Scarf uses, in addition, proof by contradiction where, implicitly, LEM (tertium non datur )
is also invoked in the context of an innitary instance (cf. [83], pp. 1026-7).
43First introduced, as pointed out above, by Giulio Ascoli in 1884, [3], in the context of
problems in the calculus of variations, but later used as the building block for the famous
Ascoli-Arzela theorem (although usually referred to in reverse order), ([55], Chapter 5). The
Arzela-Ascoli theorem is to the Heine-Borel-Theorem, as the Schauder x point theorem is to
the Brouwer x point theorem, from the point of view of generalisationof the spaces over
which the theorems are valid.
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vice of counting equations and variablesto prove existence of equilibria  is
in terms of numerical meaninglessness and computational impossibilities. It is
not as if this is the only way to formalize orthodox economic theory. Even
more unfortunate is the fact that we abuse the natural and intuitive feel for
numerical meaning and computational content that a modern generation of
students, honed in these concepts due to over-familiarity and over-exposure to
the digital world, come with, for their education in economics. Contractions
and x points can be devised for domains that preserve numerical meaning and
computational content. It is a mystery that this is not taught routinely to
students of economics, a subject that has sanctied the notion of equilibrium
and its computation.
In passing it may be apposite to point out that Sra¤as much discussed44
book, [91], is systematically and almost entirely, and uncompromisingly, con-
structive. Generations of ill-educated mathematical economists have been rig-
orously provingpropositions in [91], only because they have not had the wisdom
or education to have read the book from the point of view of constructive math-
ematics (see [101]).
3.1.2 Hahn-Banach Theorem
"Just as Molières hero [M.Jourdain] was astonished to discover
that he had been speaking prose all his life, some practical men45
may not yet have recognized that they work in ZF + DC. (To
forestall quibbling on this point we could adopt this as our denition
of practical man).
.....
Of those theorems, such as the Hahn-Banach Theorem ..., whose
usual proofs depend on the Axiom of Choice, most can be derived in
ZF +DC, provided some mild separability conditions are imposed."
Maitland Wright, [51], p. 284; italics added.
Let me conclude this section by showing, in a very general way, the role
played by the Hahn-Banach Theorem in proving the crucial Second Welfare
Theorem in economics. I shall refer to the way it is presented, proved and
discussed in [50] (although I could equally well have chosen the slightly simpler
and clearer exposition in [92]). The Second Welfare Theorem establishes the
proposition that any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be sup-
ported as a competitive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in
this proposition is in establishing the suitable price system.
44Also much-maligned by so-called mathematical economists for alleged re-inventing of
the proverbial wheel, claiming that von Neumann in his own celebrated growth model had
achieved whatever it was Sra¤a achieved in his book, but with impeccable rigour. These
claims echo von Neumanns own dismissal of the  function as being non-rigorous.
45 I am not sure at all that these are the practical menKeynes had in mind in his celebrated
concluding paragraph of the General Theory, ([42], p.283)!
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Lucas and Stokey state theirversion of the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
following way46 :
Theorem 10 Geometric form of the Hahn-Banch Theorem.
Let S be a normed vector space; let A;B  S be convex sets. Assume:
(a). Either B has an interior point and A \ B = ;,

B : closure of B

;
(b). Or, S is nite dimensional and A \B = ;;
Then: 9 a continuous linear functional , not identically zero on S; and a
constant c s.t:
(y)  c  (x); 8x 2 A and 8y 2 B:
Next, I state the economic part of the problem in merciless telegraphic form
as follows:
There areI consumers, indexed i = 1; ::::; I;
S is a vector space with the usual norm;
Consumer i chooses from commodity set Xi  S, evaluated according to the
utility function ui : Xi ! <;
There are j rms, indexed j = 1; ::::; J ;
Choice by rm j is from the technology possibility set, Yj  S; (evaluated
along prot maximising lines);
The mathematical structure is represented by the following absolutely stan-
dard assumptions:
1. 8i;Xi is convex ;
2. 8i; if x; x0 2 Ci; ui(x) > ui(x0); and if  2 (0; 1) ; then ui [x+ (1  )x0] >
ui(x
0);
3. 8i; ui : Xi ! < is continuous;
4. The set Y =
P
j Yj is convex ;
5. Either the set Y =
P
j Yj has an interior point, or S is nite dimensional ;
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is:
Theorem 11 Let assumptions 1   5 be satised; let  x0i  ;  y0j  be a Pareto
Optimal allocation; assume, for some h 2 1; :::::I	 ;9x^h 2 Xh with uh(x^h) >
uh(x
0
h): Then 9 a continuous linear functional  : S ! <; not identically zero
on S, s.t:
(a). 8i; x 2 Xi and ui(x)  ui(x0) =) (x)  (x0i );
(b). 8j; y 2 Yj =) (j)  (y0i );
46Essentially, the classicalmathematicians Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the exten-
sion of a bounded linear functional, say , from a linear subset Y of a separable normed linear
space, X, to a functional, ; on the whole space X, with exact preservation of norm; i.e.,
jj = jj. The constructive Hahn-Banach theorem, on the other hand, cannot deliver this
pseudo-exactness and preserves the extension as: jj  jj+", 8" > 0: The role of the positive
" in the constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem is elegantly discussed by Nerode,
Metakides and Constable in their beautiful piece in the Bishop Memorial Volume ([63], pp.
85-91). Again, compare the di¤erence between the classical IVT and the constructive IVT
to get a feel for the role of ":
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Anyone can see, as anyone would have seen and has seen for the last 70
years, that an economic problem has been mangledinto a mathematical form
to conform to the structure and form of a mathematical theorem. This was the
case with the way Nash formulated his problems; the way the Arrow-Debreu
formulation of the general equilibrium problem was made famous; and legions
of others.
It is a pure mechanical procedure to verify that the assumptions of the
economic problem satisfy the conditions of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and,
therefore, the powerful Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
proved47 .
It also brings with it the conundrums of the axiom of choice and all the rest
of the non-constructivites discussed in the previous section.
Let me end with a simple question: why should an economist force the
economic domain to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed
vector space? Isnt this because of pure ignorance of constructive mathematics
and a carelessness about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities
and the domain over which they should be dened?
3.2 Taming Uncomputabilities
"The best known model of mechanical computation is (still) the
rst, introduced by Turing ([99]), and after half a century of study,
few doubt the truth of the fundamental Church-Turing Thesis: A
function f : N ! N on the natural numbers (or, more generally,
on strings from a nite alphabet) is computable in principle exactly
when it can be computed by a Turing Machine."
Yiannis N. Moschovakis: What Is an Algorithm? ([60], p.920; italics
in the original))
Over the years I have discussed and demonstrated uncomputability in various
domains of economics, both micro (rational choice theory) and macro (growth
and rational expectations equilibria in overlapping generations models). In gen-
eral I have used Rices Theorem, the Unsolvability of the Halting Problem for
Turing Machines and the diagonal argument48 as the canonical recursion the-
oretic tools to prove uncomputability propositions in rational choice theory,
growth theory, etc.
In this section I want to take a non-standard economic example to discuss
uncomputabilities. In recent years my friend and collaborator, Stefano Zambelli,
has felicitously and successfully begun to investigate issues in endogenous growth
theory using the Busy Beaver as a paradigmatic metaphor ([107], [108]). The
discussion in this section is conned to some abstract remarks on the structure,
47To the best of my knowledge an equivalence between the two, analogous to that between
the Brouwer x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, proved by
Uzawa ([100]), has not been shown.
48 I began using the diagonal argument more condently in recent years only because I
learned its constructive nature rather late in my life (cf., Theorem 4, [4], p. 87).
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behaviour and implications of these fascinating repositories of uncomputabili-
ties. Apart from the inspiration from Stefano Zambellis work in endogenous
growth theory, this discussion of the apparently untamable behaviour of Busy
Beavers is also a continuation of the discussion of alternative mathematical
structures that may be more relevant for the formalization of economic theory
than the rather worn model of classicalreal analysis. In a sense the way I want
to use the Busy Beaver is entirely inspired by the idea of non-predictability of
entirely determined structures. This way the ad hockery of stochastic assump-
tions can be reduced or even eliminated in economics. I refer the interested
reader to Zambellis relevant papers to see how the discussion here can be given
economic content and relevance.
Tibor Rado introduced and dened a Busy Beaver in his classic paper:
On Non-Computable Numbers ([73]). Till about the time Rados paper was
published, the standard way of demonstrating the existence of non-computable
functions was to diagonalize out of the collection of enumerable computable
functions. Rado explicitly stated the basic principle he used to construct a
non-computable function:
The examples of non-computable functions to be discussed be-
low will be well dened in an extremely primitive sense; we shall use
only the principle that a non-empty nite set of non-negative inte-
gers has a largest element. Furthermore, we shall use this principle
only for exceptionally well-dened sets;. . . 
ibid, p.877; italics added.
What is the connection between this extremely primitive case, based on a
simple and intuitively acceptable principle and the activities of Busy Beavers,
usually dened in the literature ([8]) It is the following. Suppose an arbitrary
Turing Machine (TM ) is started, scanning a square on a blank, innite, tape,
and it halts after writing p (not necessarily consecutive) 1s, then the productivity
of the TM is p. However, any TM, initialised similarly, that does not halt 
even if it does writesome 1s as it continues to operate  is dened to be of
productivity 0. Thus we can dene the following total number-theoretic function,P
(n) for the class of n-state TMs, denoted by TMn :
Denition 12
P
(n)  Maximum productivity of any member of TMn and is
called the Busy Beaver Function.
Denition 13 Members of the Busy Beaver Club are those n-card TMs (for
any given n), when initialised on a blank, two-way innite tape, that write the
maximum number of 1s (not necessarily consecutive) on an otherwise blank tape
and halt. The Busy Beaver function is
P
(n) and the shift function associated
with this is given by S(n).
We know, from an easily derivable formula, that the number of n-card TMs,
8n, is a nite integer value. Hence,P (n) is, obviously, a total number-theoretic
function. It follows, therefore, that
P
(n) is the largest number in a nite set
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of natural numbers and the nite set of natural numbers, in turn, is the set of
productivities of n-card TMs. This, then, is how Rado uses the principle that a
non-empty nite set of non-negative integers has a largest element.
How, from this intuitive principle, does one go on to construct a non-
computable function without using a diagonal argument. For Rado explicitly
states that he eschews any reliance on this old workhorse49 :
It may be of interest to note that we shall not use an enu-
meration of computable functions to show that our examples are
non-computable functions. Thus, in this sense, we do not use the
diagonal process.
ibid, p.877; italics added.
In fact the next step taken by Rado, after dening productivity and
P
(n),
is to invoke, implicitly, the implications of the Berry Paradox, in the special
context of computable functions as TMs50 . The Berry Paradox deals with the
notion of nite denability and is semantical in nature. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to describe the construction of non-computable functions using a simple
programming language. Now, consider the following:
Proposition 14
P
(n), and a fortiori S (n), are uncomputable.
I shall give a slightly unconventional proof of this well-known proposition
in such a way that makes it possible to exploit analogies between
P
(n) and
Chaitins 
. The reasons for doing this will become evident in the sequel. It
was noted that:
. . . [T]here is the basic fact of the noncomputability of
P
(n),
which implies that no single nite computer program exists that will
furnish the value of
P
(n) for every n.
In the absence (at present) of a formal concept of noncalcu-
labilityfor individual well-dened integers, it is of course not possi-
ble to state in precise form the conjecture that there exist values of
n for which
P
(n) is not e¤ectively calculable.
[48]Lin and Rado (1965), p.212; italics added.
Is there a formal concept of randomness for individual well-dened inte-
gers? There is and it is provided by Kolmogorovs Algorithmic Complexity
49However, an eminent scholar of Busy Beaver problems asserts the contrary
Using essentially a diagonal argument he[Rado] demonstrated that if f is some
computable function then there exists a positive integer n such that
P
(k) >
f (k) for all k > n. ([9],p.239;italics added):
Since Rado invokes, albeit implicitly, the Berry Paradox, Bradys remark cannot be quite
correct, except by some considerable stretch of the imagination.
50Rado, via the Berry Paradox to non-computable functions; Gödel via the Liar and
Richard Paradoxes to incompleteness; Chaitin via the Berry Paradox to algorithmic com-
plexity; Turing via Cantors Procedure to uncomputability; such are the ways in which great
mathematical sagas have been grounded in paradoxes.
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Theory and Chaitins Algorithmic Information Theory. If it is possible to de-
ne the randomness of an integer why is it not possible to dene, formally, the
concept of noncalculability for individual well-dened integers? My basic
conjecture is that the noncalculabilityof Rados
P
(n) is exactly analogous to
the randomness of Chaitins 
 (cf [14], Part II, pp.80-82). Chaitin constructed
his uncomputable and random 
, exploiting a form of the Berry Paradox ; I shall,
however, exploit it for deriving the crucial contradiction in proving the uncom-
putability of
P
(n). The reason for emphasising this link between Chaitins 

and Rados
P
(n) via the Berry Paradox is, partly, to make a point of the status
of proofs by contradiction when impredicative denitions are involved.
A few unnecessary cobwebs must, rst, be cleared away. There are those
who claim even eminent Busy Beaver scholars- that a variant of the diag-
onal method was used to construct
P
(n), despite an explicit statement to
the contrary by Rado himself (see above and op.cit, p.877). Then, there are
equally eminent textbook writers who assert that Rados construction of the
Busy Beaver was based on Richards paradox51 . Neither of these assertions are
quite correct. Rados construction uses, albeit implicitly, the Berry paradox,
which being semantical is not directly related to the more obviously diagonal
based Cantor and Russell logical paradoxes.
So far as I know, proof by contradiction has been the only way that the
uncomputability of
P
(n) has been rigorouslydemonstrated. Even in proofs
where there seems to be an explicit construction, for example in the well-known
and clear demonstration in Boolos and Je¤rey (op.cit, especially chapter 4), it
is, in reality, by way of a thought experimentto justify the assumption of the
contrary to the hypothesis in the theorem. I am never sure that such proofs
convey the real meaning of a theorem, particularly when the theorem asserts
that something cannot be constructed, decided or computed. Therefore, before
I myself give a proof by contradictionof the uncomputability of
P
(n), it may
be useful to discuss the intuitive content of the meaning of this strange52 result.
The intuitive reasons normally given to explain the uncomputability of
P
(n)
is that it growstoo fast to be computed by the standard operations on intu-
itively acceptable and formally computable elementary functions. A brilliant
51Thus, Neil Jones (1997), in an otherwise exceptionally well-written and admirably
pedagogical textbook on Computability and Complexitystates (pp.16-7; second set of italics
added):
"The busy beaver function ..., due to Rado and related to the Richard paradox, is mathemat-
ically well-dened, but based on certain reasonable assumptions about the language used to
express computation"
Two minor caveats may be called for to make this assertion more acceptable. Firstly,
it is not
P
(n) that is related to the Richard paradox but the method of proof; secondly,
in a convoluted way, it is not incorrect to state what Jones has asserted simply because the
Richard paradox is related to the Berry paradox, since they are both semantic in origin
(using Ramseys distinction between logical and semantic paradoxes; cf. Ramsey, 1926 and
Kleene, 1967, esp. pp. 188-190).
52Strangeonly because, as noted by Rado himself,
P
(n) is an exceptionally well-dened
number, in that its existence follows from a simple well-ordering principle: that a nite set
of numbers has a maximum.
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and graphic description of this idea is given by Dewdney in his ne expository
piece on Busy Beavers:
The function
P
(n) has an extraordinary property: it is not
computable. It simply grows too fast. From the rst four values
of
P
(n) namely 1,4,6 and 13  it might seem that the rate of
growth is only moderate. . . . . On the other hand, [there is] a 12-
state machine that generates so many 1s that the number must be
expressed by the following mind-boggling formula:
6 409640964096
::
:4096
4
The number 4,096 appears 166 times in the formula, 162 times
in the twilight zone represented by the three dots. The formula
can be evaluated from the top down: rst raise 4,096 to the fourth
power, then raise 4,096 to the power of the resulting number, then
raise 4,096 to the power of that number, and so on. When you reach
the bottom, multiply by 6.
Anyone whose mind does not boggle when confronted by a
string of 1s that long is welcome to construct an even bigger number.
Write down any formula you like in which numbers are multiplied
or raised to a power; you may even replace any of the numbers with
n. No matter what formula you devise, for some value of n that
is large enough the n-state busy beaver will produce more 1s than
the formula species. It follows that
P
(n) cannot be calculated for
arbitrary large values of n. The best one can do is to calculate
P
(n)
for some small, xed value of n.
Dewdney (op.cit), pp. 10-11; italics added.
But there seems another catch: No matter what formula [we] devise, for
some value of n that is large enough the n-state busy beaver will produce more
1s than the formula species! Now, in our worldof discourse, all formulas
are computation rules, programme specications. Does this mean, whatever
computation rule we may devise, whatever programming language we use, is not
powerful enough conceptually, computationally, syntactically or semantically to
tame
P
(n)? How, we may then ask, was randomness tamed by algorithmic
complexity theory and algorithmic information theory? Is there a lesson to be
learned and applied from that experience?
There is, however, an almost exact analogy, in the history of classical re-
cursion theory, to the role played by Rados
P
(n) vis-à-vis TMs, programming
semantics and, via the Church-Turing thesis, the partial recursive functions. It
is the place of the Ackerman function vis-à-vis primitive recursion. The analo-
gies are uncannily similar and I shall pursue it to elucidate the di¢ culties one
faces with any attempt to tame
P
(n).
By an enumeration of the primitive recursive functions, coupled to a simple
diagonalization procedure, the existence of a computable function that was
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total but not primitive recursive was easily shown. This was similar to the
situation with the demonstration of the existenceof uncomputable functions
via diagonalization out of an enumeration of the computable function. Rado,
as I pointed out above, expressed dissatisfaction at this nonconstructiveex-
istence demonstration and endeavoured to construct, explicitly, an intuitively
acceptable function that was, nevertheless, shown to be uncomputable. Simi-
larly, the Ackerman function was accepted as an intuitively computable function
that was not primitive recursive. This led to an enlargement of the class of in-
tuitively acceptable computable function and a new operation, minimalization,
was introduced to the old repertoire of composition and primitive recursion and
the partial recursive functions were dened. Is the lesson from that important
episode in the history of classical recursion theory that we can try to enlarge the
rules of operation or expand the class of initial functions so as to bring into the
fold of the computable also
P
(n)? The problem, however, with
P
(n) vis-à-vis
TMs, partial recursive functions, etc., is that no one seems to have been able to
gure out a newoperation that can tame the activities of the Busy Beaver.
Let me now prove Proposition 14. I shall therefore attempt to present an
alternative perspective for which it is necessary to restate Proposition 1 in a
slightly di¤erent, but formally equivalent, way. Before I present this alterna-
tive version of Proposition 1, consider the following standard result in classical
recursion theory ([59], p.156, theorem 5.5):
Theorem 15 The length of the shortest program that prints n and halts is not
computable.
Compare the form and content of the above theorem with the following ([15],
p.4):
Theorem 16 The rst positive integer that can be proved (relative to a given
formal axiomatic system) to have the property that it cannot be specied (relative
to a given Universal Turing Machine) by a computer program with less than N
bits is uncomputable.
Next, compare both of the above theorems with the following version of
Berrys Paradox (Russell, 1908, p.222). Consider the least integer not nameable
in less than nineteen syllables. This refers to the particular number 111,777. But
the italicised expression also names an integer and contains eighteen syllables! In
other words, the least integer not nameable in less than nineteen syllables, i.e.,
111,777, can be named in eighteen syllables. This is the kind of contradiction
that is exploited in the proof of the above two theorems. For example, in
Theorem 16, the strategy of the proof is to show that there is, in fact, a computer
program of length log2N +constant = N , for su¢ ciently large N , which will
specify the same number and hence to display a contradiction. Exactly the same
strategy is employed in proving Theorem, 15.
Now here is my alternative statement of Proposition 1:
Proposition 17 For any given n, the largest value that can be printed by a
program of length (at most) n, is uncomputable.
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Remark 18 Clearly, Proposition 17 is a kind of converse of Theorem 15. Hence,
a proof of the former will only need to mimic the strategy adopted to prove the
latter. The a¢ nity with the form of the Berry Paradox is also evident. And,
with respect to Theorem 16, if we replace the phrase rst positive integerwith
the largest positive integer, then the analogy with it is also clear.
Proof. Suppose
P
(n) is computable. Dene an auxiliary constant-valued
function f by minimalization such that, for any given m:
f (m) = j and
X
(j)  m (3)
The minimalized function f returns the natural number j such that no pro-
gram of length less thanm prints j and halts. Clearly, the length of the program
for f constants + the bits necessary to code m so that f can make sure thatP
(j)  m. The latter value is at most log2m. Denote the constant value as
c: Then the length of the program to implement f is less that jc+ log2mj : If,
now, m is chosen large enough to make sure that it is su¢ ciently greater than
log2m then for such a choice, say m0, f computes the least value j such that
no program of length less than m0 can print j: But m0 was chosen to guarantee
that the program for computing f was, in fact, less than m0. This contradiction
implies that
P
(n) is computable.
Proving, by contradiction, the uncomputability of
P
(n), exploits the full
force and potentialities of the Berry Paradox. Where lies the paradoxical aspect
of the Berry Paradox? It lies in what was called impredicative denitions by
Poincaré, denitions that involve some aspect of self-reference where, however,
the paradox arises from allowing totalities to be members of themselves. Russell,
inspired partly by Poincaré, was led to develop his theory of types to tackle these
paradoxes. This is not the place to go into the full and fascinating details of these
issues but it may be pertinent to repeat some of Russells pertinent observations
on at least the Berry Paradox.
Why are we able to resort to proof by contradiction to demonstrate the
validity of any proposition that is related to the Berry Paradox? It is, as Russell
pointed out almost a century ago, because (op.cit., p.223; italics in original) :
In the cases of names and denitions [i.e., the Berry and Richard
Paradoxes], the paradoxes result from considering nonnameability
and indenability as elements of names and denitions. .... In each
contradiction something is said about all cases of some kind, and
from what is said a new case seems to be generated, which both is
and is not of the same kind as the cases of which all were concerned
in what was said.
More particularly, regarding the Berry (and Richard) Paradox :
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The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables
involves the totality of names, for it is the least integer such that
all names either do not apply to it or have more than nineteen syl-
lables. Hence we assume, in obtaining the contradiction, that a
phrase containing all names is itself a name, though it appears
from the contradiction that it cannot be one of the names which
were supposed to be all the names there are. Hence, all namesis
an illegitimate notion.
ibid, p.224; italics added.
I do not know of any proof of the uncomputability of
P
(n) that does not
invoke some version of this illegitimate notion. On the other hand, Chaitin,
in constructing 
, did circumvent the illegitimacy by restricting the scope of
nameabilityor denability. He achieved this restriction by specifying name-
abilityand denabilityto satisfy the requirement of being calculated outputs
of a suitably dened UTM.
What are to make of this situation? Perhaps there is no need to prove
that
P
(n) is uncomputable; it may be su¢ cient to demonstrate that danger-
ous curses of dimensionality may lie wrapped in the enigma that is the Busy
Beaver. It may well be that we should resort to a Linnean philosophy of inves-
tigation: careful study of small, selected, well structured examples and diligent
classication. This is not unlike the practice of the dynamical system theorist
who wishes to tame the vagaries of nonlinear systems.
I shall, however, suggest another alternative in the face of this humbling of
formalism and its methods, inicted by the Busy Beaver. This alternative sug-
gestion, entirely based on an extremely interesting attackon the vagaries ofP
(n) by Greenleaf ([32]), when supplemented with Chaitins careful circum-
vention of the Berry Paradox, results in a partial humbling of the Busy Beaver!
The strategy carried out by Russell and others (Poincaré, Weyl etc.) to
banish impredicative denitions from mathematical discourse - may smack of
a mildly defeatist attitude. Paradoxes play the kind of role counter-examples
play in sharpening an understanding of the scope of mathematical theorems. A
world of mathematical semantics without paradoxes may well be poorer even
from an epistemological viewpoint.
There is a more elegant way out of this dilemma. The idea for this alternative
way was motivated by trying to dene the value of
P
(n), for any given n, in such
a way that it will dampen its growth rate. To put it more prosaically, I want to
drug the Busy Beaver into slowing down its eagerness! This is my interpretation
of the elegant approach suggested by Greenleaf (op.cit), which is based on a
philosophy of mathematics that is particularly signicant in any attempt to
tame the behaviour of
P
(n), without losing the rich insights into emergent
computations that such behaviour gives rise to. Let me summarize, rst, the
mathematical philosophy that underpins Greenleafs concrete suggestions to
manage a meaningful study of
P
(n):
 The triple {assumption, proof, conclusion} can be understood in
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terms of {input data, algorithm, output data}.
 Mathematics is best regarded as a very high level programming language.
 In constructive, computable53 and (constructive) nonstandard analysis,
every proof is an algorithm.
 To understand a theorem (in any kind of mathematics) in algorithmic
terms, represent the assumptions as input data and the conclusions as
output data. Then try to convert the proof into an algorithm which will
take in the input and produce the desired output. If you are unable to
do this, it is probably because the proof relies essentially on the law of
excluded middle.
 If we take algorithms and data structures to be fundamental, then it is nat-
ural to dene and understand functions in these terms. The phrase non-
computable functionthen becomes problematic, and the understanding
which sees almost all functions as non-computable becomes mysterious.
If a function does not correspond to an algorithm, what can it be? There
is no higher court corresponding to the set theory of logical mathematics.
 We shall take the stand that functions are, by denition, computable, and
then test those phenomena which are standardly taken as evidence for
the existence of non-computable functions, to see if we need to yield any
ground.
 Given a putative function f say Rados P (n) we do not ask Is it
computable?but rather What are the data types of the domain and of
the range?This question will often have more than one natural answer,
and we will need to consider both restricted and expanded domain/range
pairs. Distinguishing between these pairs will require that we reject ex-
cluded middle for undecidable propositions. If you attempt to pair an
expanded domain for f with a restricted range, you will come to the con-
clusion that f is non-computable.
To use this alternative vision of mathematics and mathematical activity
towards a reinterpretation and taming of the activities of the Busy Beaver , it
will be helpful to begin by considering the rigorous denition of a real number,
either via a Dedekind cut or via a Cauchy sequence of rationals54 . In the
former case the set R of real numbers is dened as the collection of all Dedekind
cuts and the elements of R are then dened as certain subsets of Q. In the
latter case, real numbers are equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational
numbers. There is, of course, more algorithmic content in the denition of R
53 In the case of a¢ rmative, existence, proofs. Universal negative propositions use the full
paraphernalia of classical logic, including the law of the excluded middle.
54 I shall not consider the other two methods: via nested intervals or by means of decimal
expansion to a base, say b, where b is an integer > 0. Goodsteins uniform calculus, for
example, proceeds by way of the latter method.
37
as equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, but the point is
that in both denitions a real number is characterized in terms of a collection
of rational numbers.
A real number can only be determined up to a pre-assigned degree of ap-
proximation. Some real numbers are hard to describe, i.e., compute; they are
algorithmically highly complex. It takes time to determine them even to low lev-
els of approximation. If, taking a cue from this setup, we dene
P
(n) in some
equivalent way, we would kill the proverbial two birds with one stone: on the
one hand, slow down the growth rate of
P
(n); on the other, make it analogous
to Chaitins 
. The idea would be to determine the binary code of any given
(combinatorial) object and dene its Busy Beaver complexity as the minimum
k-card TM that would print the number of 1s in that code (perhaps separated
by ordered blanks). In this way, we might be able to free the denition of
complexity even from its underpinnings on any concept of information; instead
dening it dynamically in a natural setting. In other words, every combinatorial
object (i.e., algorithmic object) will be the output of some Busy Beaver. The
complexity of the given object is the algorithmic description of the minimum
Busy Beaver that would print its code and halt. Obviously, this complexity,
too, would be uncomputable.
Now to return to Greenleafs philosophy of mathematics and its use in tam-
ing the activities of the Busy Beaver, we exploit the analogies inherent in another
aspect of the real numbers: their denitions as sets of rational numbers plus an
approximation scheme and degree (for example in the Cauchy characterization
of R). The rst question in this endeavour, given the above summary of Green-
leafs mathematical philosophy, what is the appropriate data type for studyingP
(n)? It is in answering this question that the analogy of dening the mem-
bers of R as subsets of Q will be exploited. It may be best to state Greenleafs
solutionbefore even describing its structure:
The busy beaver function bb [P (n)] becomes computable when
its domain and range are properly dened. When the domain is
taken to be N, the range will be the set of weak integers, a superset
of N . . . 
ibid, p.226; italics added.
The weak integers, in essence, weaken the over-enthusiasm of the Busy
Beavers. Weak integersare constructed and dened relative to a given UTM
in the following way:
Step 1:
For any given k, implement the given UTM to enumerate all k-card TMs.
Step 2:
Next, execute each k-card TM from the enumerated list on a standard two-
way innite blank tape for some given, arbitrarily long, time interval.
Step 3:
Whenever a Busy Beaver is found, its productivity is listed on an auxiliary
tape.
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Step 4:P
(k) : N! fN N;UTMg
where the range is given by a pair constructed as follows: to each element
in the enumerated list of k-state TMs, associate the result, an integer, which is
possibly the determined productivity associated with it or a temporaryvalue
obtained from an Oracle computation, by the given UTM55 .
Thus the set of weak integers, say , are approximations from below in the
same sense in which semi-computable functions are dened to approximate from
above and below and the analogy goes even further: naturally, , too, will be a
recursively enumerable set that is not recursive. The standard integers will be
the singleton sets and, therefore, N  . Natural order relations can be dened
over , but I leave the interested reader to consult Greenleaf (op.cit) for such
details.
I have tried to suggest a mathematical way of taming uncomputabilities
by identifying their nature. Before minimalization was introduced to tame the
growth of primitive recursive functions, the explosion of the behaviour of the
Akerman function was a perplexity. After the introduction by Rado of the
Busy Beavers industriousness, the perplexity has been renewed. Whether the
suggestion above is a way out of, and beyond, this renewed perplexity, I am
not sure. But I am convinced of its relevance for the formalization of economic
theory and for understanding the paradoxes of endogenous growth, as perceived
by Zambellis modelling of endogenous forces non-stochastically
4 Reconstructing Mathematical Economics
"Fred Richman [concludes] .. that once a mathematician sees the
distinction between constructive and nonconstructive mathematics,
he or she will choose the former. That conclusion, if extrapolated
further than Professor Richman intended, suggests that any mathe-
matician can learn constructivism easily if he or she do desires.
But in fact constructivism is unusually di¢ cult to learn. Learn-
ing most mathematical subjects merely involves adding to ones
knowledge, but learning constructivism involves modifying all as-
pects of ones knowledge: theorems, methods of reasoning, technical
vocabulary, and even the use of everyday words that do not seem
technical, such as or."
Eric Schechter ([85], p.51)
Learning constructive mathematics may well require an aesthetic sensibility
which will have to be nurtured with deliberation, rather like the way the new
mathematicsof Bourbakism penetrated education curricula at elementary levels
to change visions, expectations and hopes. Few remember the noble motivations
of the young Frenchman who survived or who remembered the legions of lost
55At this last stage of the last step I part company with Greenleaf, mainly because I wish
to retain the analogy with Chaitins 
.
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compatriots in the Great War and vowed to create a sanitised mathematics
that will not be manipulated for ulterior purposes. Few will be motivated by
the foundational crises and the battles between intellectual giants, ghting for
the soul of the foundations of mathematics, that led to the emergence of Con-
structive Mathematics as we know it today. Lip service is paid to the battles,
sometimes undignied, between Hilbert and Brouwer and between Kronecker
and Cantor, but now, after Bishop and others, Constructive Mathematics is a
serious discipline in its own right.
A legitimate question, one that a classically trained mathematician may ask
a Constructive Mathematician, is the following. Alright, she might say; Ill
try to begin my re-education by reading Bishop ([4]); but can you give me
some methodological guidelines? By this the sympathetic classicalmathe-
matician may mean the following: give me a hint, or a set of precepts, that
would allow me to understand the extent to which classicalmathematics is
idealizedconstructive mathematics(strenuously avoiding the seemingly con-
descending statement that constructive mathematics is the approximating ver-
sion of classicalmathematics, implying that the latter is ideal mathematics).
To this Bishop has already given helpful answers in terms of the Principle of
Omniscience (PO), Limited Principle of Omniscience (LPO), Lesser Limited
Principle of Omniscience (LLPO), their conjoint use with various versions of
the axiom of choice, and their connections with the law of the excluded mid-
dle (LEM ), the law of double negation (++ P =) P ), etc., and, hence, also
modes of proof - whether it is a proof by contradiction, by contraposition, and
so on (cf. [4], pp. 8-11; [12], pp. 9-11). Thus, Bishop was able to say, almost
categorically ([4], p.9, italics added) :
"The proof that the real numbers can be well ordered is an instance
of a proof in which a sweeping use of the principle of omniscience is
combined with an appeal to the axiom of choice. Such proofs o¤er
little hope of constructivization."
It may be useful to point out that LPO is a special case of LEM and IVT
is equivalent to LLPO; the classicalHahn-Banach theorem =) LLPO; and so
on. Such an understanding shows what to look for, and where, in a classical
proof so as to constructivise it. This was easy in the case of IVT; a little less
easy in the case of the Hahn-Banach theorem; much more di¢ cult in the case
of the Brouwer x point theorem, etc.
But, if Schechter is right, and constructive mathematics is unusually di¢ -
cult to learnby mathematicians (and, perhaps, equally, or even more di¢ cult,
to teach), then imagine how much more di¢ cult the task is in economics? In
particular, when unlearned and obviously ignorant and prejudiced statements
are made by reputable economists, but also by silly mathematical economists.
On the one hand, we have two distinguished economists claiming constructivity
and computability of models that are clearly neither the one nor the other:
"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium
theory has been to demonstrate the existence of ... an equilibrium
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by showing the applicability of mathematical xed point theorems
to economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium mod-
els to policy issues involves computing equilibria, these xed point
theorems are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium
exists for a given model before attempting to compute that equilib-
rium. .....
...
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide
non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not pro-
vide techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Sec-
ond, existence per se has no policy signicance. .... Thus, xed point
theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of mod-
els prior to the models use in comparative static policy analysis;
such theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior
will actually change when policies change. They can only be em-
ployed in this way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to
nd actual equilibria). The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani
xed point theorems in this direction is what underlies the work of
Scarf .... on xed point algorithms ...."
[89], p.12 & pp. 20-1; italics added
Surely, the blame should be placed on the use of a mathematical framework
which encourages and thrives on this separation between proving existence
and determining it? This is exactly the core di¤erence between classicaland
constructive mathematics. Mathematical Economics is replete with appeals to
x point theorems because economics is obsessed with the logical problem of
equilibrium existence. But policy and any other interesting implication of such
a mythical equilibrium calls forth constructive processes, hopefully analogous
to the actual individual and institutional ones, determining it. The melancholy
fact that even the good intentions and claims in the above quote are technically
incorrect, as shown above, in this paper.
On the other hand, we have pseudo-sophisticated authors of indigestible
texts on mathematics for economistsadvising students to learn constructive
mathematics in their spare time, even while the authors own understanding
of the subject is hopelessly wrong:
"If you want to learn about intuitionism in mathematics, I suggest
reading - in your spare time, please - the four articles by Heyting
and Brouwer in Benacerraf and Putnam .. ."
[64], p. 279, footnote, 47; italics added.
This book is liberally endowed with inanities regarding the axiom of choice,
functions as rules and many other things dealt with above, in this paper - and the
book is almost paradigmatic of the way mathematics is taught in advanced eco-
nomic curricula. The poor economist, trying to learn the mathematics relevant
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to hone a natural economic intuition, is fed absolute rubbish with pretensions
of scholarship where none exist.
The mathematical economist seems to have lost touch with the history of
the subject, with the impulses that motivated the pioneers when they sought
to formalize economic theory. Thus we have a distinguished mathematician,
writing together with a reputable economist, claiming that the natural domain
of economic theory is that which is determined by real analysis:
"Computing with real numbers o¤ers some important advantages
in the context of scientic computing. ... it is also relevant to ap-
plications in economic theory. Economic models typically use real
variables and functions of them. A model of computing in which
the elementary operations are functions of real variables allows the
model to be directly applied to standard economic models, without
requiring an analysis of approximations in each application."
[61], pp. 1-2; italics added.
We are, of course, not told why economic models typically use real variables
and functions of them; nor are we told why the important advantages ... of
scientic computing o¤ers for computing with real numbers (as advanced by
Blum and others, for example in [7]) has any relevance for economic modelling
where the variable are naturally in N, Q, or Z. Moreover, the book appeals
to the results Kolmogorov and Arnold obtained when resolving (negatively)
Hilberts conjecture as expressed in the 13th of his famous problems of 1900.
But the authors do not seem to have understood the di¤erence between exact
approximations and precise computations. Had they understood it, they could
have advocated economic modelling with Interval Analysis ([58]), Constructive
Analysis ([4]) or Computable Analysis ([1]) - or even Nonstandard Analysis56 .
But this requires harder work at a more fundamental economic theoretical level,
in addition to learning a whole new mathematics. So, we are condemned to
repeat the mistakes of accidental commitments in the past, rather like being
trapped in the clutches of QWERTY.
I dont think, in fact, it will be as di¢ cult to teach constructive and com-
putable analysis to economists, from ground zero. The young who are computer
literate can be taught calculus the way Rosser tried to introduce functions as a
rule in the sense in which it would become the foundations for the same notion
at the higher level of the   calculus and then on to programming languages.
The young who are taught the IVT ab initio will, surely, think it most natural,
especially if they are sitting at a terminal while being taught it.
Above all, the lesson I have learned while writing this paper - through the
brain in the hand- is a lesson that I did not expect I would try to make a case
for when I set out to write it. I now feel the non-constructive mathematical
formalism of economic theory is the main culprit in infesting the subject with
56The embarrassing mistakes in the bibliography in [61] crowns its misleading contents, quite
appropriately. The most irritating examples of the bibliographic mistakes were the incorrect
titles of two of the classic books on approximation theory - those by Lorentz and Vitushkin.
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undecidabilities, uncomputabilities and unsolvabilities. I am less condent than
I was before writing this paper that these conundrums are intrinsic to the sub-
ject. Institutional mechanisms evolve, naturally, to confront and resolve these
di¢ culties - in spite of the analytical paralysis shown by mathematical econo-
mists. I recall a characteristically pungent answer by Ulam to a provocative
question put by Gian-Carlo Rota ([80], pp.2-3; italics added):
"What makes you so sure that mathematical logic corresponds to
the way we think? You are su¤ering from what the French call a
deformation professionelle. Look at the bridge over there! It was
built following logical principles. Suppose that a contradiction was
to be found in set theory. Do you honestly believe that the bridge
might then fall down?"
We have lost the tradition perhaps we never had it of the kind of method-
ologies fostered and practised by the Feynmans and the Diracs in theoretical
physics, whereby the perplexities of the natural sciences and the world it ob-
serves and studies, and of which it is a part, are resolved by imaginative mathe-
matics, not shackled by any kind of orthodox strictures of the pure mathemati-
cian. We, in mathematical economics, have constrained our visions and our
tools and bent our concepts to t an untting mathematics and generated un-
decidable, uncomputable and non-constructive conundrums that are unnatural
for the subject.
Gödel thought - and Feferman disagreed - that new axioms will need to be
developed and new axiomatic thinking fostered, to tame unnatural incomplete-
ness. Gödel also thought that an exact metaphysics was possible. I nd myself
on Ferfermans side - and, therefore, also on Diracs side - on the question of
the need for new axioms - but from the point of view of formal economic theory.
But I nd myself agreeing with Gödel that, in the face of unnatural perplexities,
the human mind will strive to resolve them by developing thought processes and
systems of thought that will allow them to be seen for what they are: paradoxes
to be used as spurs for new adventures in intellectual journeys.
It is appropriate, at this Conference in Honour the greatest logician since
Aristotle, that I end my contribution reecting on the words of Gödel, words
that many distinguished living logicians  like Solomon Feferman  think en-
capsulated his philosophy, and guided his epistemology ([25], p. 103):
"Not only were Gödels results stunning, but also his own explana-
tion of why they hold was surprising. .. [I]t expressed a fundamental
conviction of Gödels which he reiterated throughout the rest of his
life... ."
The explained conviction was expressed with characteristic guardedness and
precision ([29], p.191, quotation from the English translation, [30] ; italics
added):
"[T]he true reason for the incompleteness inherent in all formal sys-
tems of mathematics is that the formation of ever higher types can
43
be continued into the transnite ... [since] the undecidable proposi-
tions constructed here become decidable whenever appropriate higher
types are added."
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